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In the first half of the twentieth century, a cadre of colonial engineers and officials 
promoted a grand damming and canalization project for a major imperial river. Scholars 
have begun to uncover the significance of such imperial water control projects 
undertaken in the name of efficiency, revenue, social uplift. Christopher V. Hill, for 
example, describes Britain’s efforts to dam and control the Kosi River in northeastern 
India, Timothy Mitchell analyzes water control in Egypt and its consequences for 
indigenous society and imperial objectives, and David Gilmartin offers a comparative 
picture of a culture of river management among British Indian officialdom.1 This is 
another history of an imperial river, a river that won the attention of colonial officials 
with long experience overseeing projects of damming, embanking, and almost 
reinventing rivers. This is yet another case in which engineers—the same engineers who 
had refashioned the Nile and Indus—promoted plans for “improving” both land and 
society through a monumental river project. That river was the Thames. 
  Between 1900 and 1950, a succession of engineers, legislators, and other public 
figures developed and promoted a project to construct a dam across the River Thames 
south and east of London.  According to the plan, the river’s level would rise to its 
historical high-water mark above the dam, really a barrage. Over forty miles of the 
Thames would cease to be a tidal estuary, the tides locked out of central London. This 
new “river lake,” as the scheme’s promoters called it, was envisioned as providing a new 
port for ocean-going vessels; cargo ships and passenger liners would pass through 
massive locks and glide nearly into the heart of London. Waterbuses would ply the lake, 
enlarging public transport. And the barrage itself would incorporate a rail line within and 
a new highway on top. It was project designed to increase London’s wealth and make the 
river more “useful” to society. “If we succeed,” argued the project’s supporters, “…we 
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shall…make room for a resuscitation [of the river] in line with modern requirements and 
enabling amenities for the millions living on its shores which centuries have failed to 
acquire for them.”2 And the scheme would eliminate a “dismal and dreary” terrain in far 
East London to be replaced with “modern accommodation” on transformed river’s shores 
and employment in new industries built there for “the working population.”3 
 The project’s backers could as easily have been speaking of the Sindh or the Nile 
as the Thames. They could as easily have be arguing about a woeful lack of development 
of the natural advantages of the Punjab region as of London; as easily discussing 
improving the lot of native towndwellers in Singapore or Hong Kong as working-class 
Englishmen in East London. Far from a coincidence, former colonial officials and 
engineers who had overseen the damming and rearranging of other rivers in the Empire 
held many leadership positions in the Thames Barrage Association. And the association 
held up those engineers’ names—Sir Murdoch MacDonald of the Nile, Sir Thomas Ward 
of the Indus—like standards at their vanguard. The barrage proponents argued that these 
men’s experiences with engineering in the Empire demonstrated the social and economic 
value offered by mammoth river control projects and qualified them to advance one for 
the imperial capital. The engineers and other Association members and supporters 
argued, in other words, that they could do for London what they claimed to have done for 
Cairo or Lahore: enhance the efficiency of the landscape for the betterment of colonial 
denizens and the wealth and success of the empire at the same time. In the words of one 
barrage supporter speaking in the House of Lords, there’s was an “up-to-date 
scheme…which spells improvement and advance…which we have been witnessed in 
many other countries in respect of their rivers.”4 
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 This is a case in which colonial engineers and administrators, working in concert 
with engineers and officials based in Britain, sought to employ the “tools of empire” on 
the metropole.5 Put more subtly, it is an instance in which colonial engineers brought 
frameworks within which they promoted and executed river projects in the colonies to 
bear on a project for the imperial capital. In that way, the Thames Barrage was colonial. 
Colonialism as it is usually defined comprises a dominating non-native group and a 
subordinate native people. But this case suggests the usefulness of expanding this 
definition. This project may be described as “colonial” because it embodied the ideals 
underpinning colonial water projects. It was colonial because it was championed by 
figures famous for their role in colonial water projects, figures who tried to parlay that 
fame into success for the London scheme. And it was colonial because it proposed 
creating a working-class colony in far eastern London with new industry and public 
transport intended to “improve” East End natives. This is a case, in sum, in which 
impulses so often directed outward by colonial water engineers were directed instead at 
the metropolitan core by the very same individuals. 
 This case contributes to a growing literature that recharacterizes the relationship 
between European colonial centers and the non-European societies that Europeans sought 
to manipulate and dominate. This case, simply stated, informs historians’ attempts to 
describe the imperial center and periphery. For decades, historians of the British Empire 
have rejected the model that simply saw power and influence centered in the metropole 
and straightforwardly projected onto the colonial periphery by the dictates of crowns, 
viceroys, or district officers.6 Instead, they have offered a picture in which European 
influence occurred at delimited sites or “beachheads,” through a range of actors that 
extended far beyond governors and institutions. And the transmission of power was 
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complicated, compromised, and resisted. Colonial influence happened through 
performances, representations, disciplines, subtle limits to traditional ways of life, and 
through the creation of social spaces that encouraged certain behaviors while inhibiting 
others.7 Among these transformations, technologies, especially those for controlling and 
distributing water, were particularly powerful in influencing non-European societies.8  
Not only has this literature complicated simple narratives about center and 
periphery, it has suggested a multi-directional flow of influence and information.9 
Networks of influence were not always centered on London and some cross-colonial 
networks cultivated the exchange of ideas, commerce, and political influence with little 
regard to the imperial capital. Tony Ballantyne, for example, describes about the 
development of concepts of race that largely excluded London, moving instead between 
India, New Zealand, Ireland, and elsewhere.10 Thomas Metcalf and Priya Satia depict 
India itself as a powerful nexus of empire, with the Government of India seeking its own 
interests in the Middle East and Indian Ocean to such an extent that it blurs the identity of 
India as colonized or colonizer.11 And a growing body of work suggests that 
administrators and other figures who spent their career in the far-flung empire were less 
agents of the center bearing its decrees outward as natives of neither center nor periphery. 
Indeed, they understood that their identity, rooted in two worlds, enhanced their 
authority.12 
Key figures in the Thames Barrage Association were not wholly natives of either 
center or periphery. Prominent politicians who advocated for the scheme, like Sir Louis 
Dane, spent most of their working lives in the empire. Other eminent figures promoting 
the barrage like Sir Thomas Ward were born in the various corners of the empire and 
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built their own water projects exclusively outside of Britain. They were members of a 
culture that spanned the world, even if it manifested itself in different ways in different 
corners. It was as natural for inhabitants of that culture to advocate for a project of large-
scale water control in the London region as it was for them to advocate water control in 
the hinterland of Karachi.  
This case undermines the very usefulness of the concept of a center and periphery. 
Personnel and concepts echoed around the corners of the empire, shifting, redirecting, 
transforming with each ricochet. In this story, the personnel moving through imperial 
society are the water control engineers who oversaw dam projects in India, then Egypt, 
then advocated the same for London. The overlaying idea is one that colonial 
administrators and other figures saw at the center of their civilizing mission: the concept 
of technology as a force for both profit and for “improving” (as they understood the idea) 
the lot of common people. The literature on this culture of technological faith and 
universalism is underdeveloped. Mitchell partially focuses on it in his Rule of Experts, 
but there has been surprisingly little work on it since Headrick wrote extensively about 
the great faith that officials and engineers placed in technology as a transformative, 
“civilizing” force in the empire.13 But unlike Headrick’s uni-directional picture of 
transformation, this case suggests that ideas about the role of water in society bounced 
between Manchester, Bombay, back through the Institution of Civil Engineers in London, 
to Alexandria, and back again to London.  
A colonial association 
The Thames Barrage Association formed in the first years of the twentieth century and 
carried on its efforts through the Second World War.14 It first converged around a design 
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by T.W. Barber, a civil engineer who worked in Russia and England, and James Casey, a 
Britain-based nautical engineer. From its earliest days, the Association compared its 
Thames project to those underway on rivers in the empire, calling it “similar to that 
across the Nile.”15 By the 1930s the leadership of the Association itself became 
overwhelmingly colonial in professional background. In those years, a network of 
officials and engineers who had made their names in the empire became the leaders and 
promoters of the Barrage Association. Vice-president Alexander Reid had built bridges 
and hydroelectric works in China, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.16 Fellow board member Sir 
Thomas Ward was born in the Cape Colony and spent most of his professional life in 
India. He canalized rivers, oversaw the irrigation works of Punjab, offered a proposal for 
the irrigation of Mesopotamia, and eventually rose to the position of chief engineer for 
overseeing irrigation in all of British India.17 Member Arnold Musto joined the 
Association upon returning from India where he had just contributed to the damming of 
the Indus with the Lloyd (later, Sukkur) Barrage, one of the world’s largest.18 The 
greatest engineering name associated with the proposal was Association Vice-President 
Murdoch MacDonald, who was one of the earliest and most vigorous promoters of the 
scheme, active in writing and appearing on its behalf.19 He contributed to the construction 
of the Aswan Dam on the Nile and Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile and spent two decades 
directing other embankment, canal, and damming projects on the river. He ended his 
career abroad as head of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, essentially placing him 
in charge of the Nile and its ever-growing network of technology.20  
 Beyond the engineers, the barrage scheme’s supporters also numbered colonial 
officials and planners. Architect and town planner Edwin Lutyens was a vice-president.21 
Strongly associated with the design of New Dehli, Lutyens sought to recreate some of the 
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grand tableaux he had made in the Indian capital in the imperial capital.22 To realize his 
monumental vision, he argued that he required a stabilized river level.23 He also believed 
that the Thames Barrage would enhance both the efficiency of London transport.24 
Barrage advocate Edgar Bonham-Carter had a long career as an administrator in 
Mesopotamia and the Sudan. There, he aided in the creation of a vast canalization and 
damming project on the Blue Nile, one of the river’s tributaries.25 He laid the legal 
groundwork for the project, consulted with Murdoch MacDonald and other water 
engineers, and helped negotiate the scheme through diplomatic twist and turns around 
Khartoum, London, and Cairo.26 Upon his retirement from the empire, Bonham-Carter 
became a London County Councilor and turned his attention improving the metropolis. 
Barrage supporter Lord Snell was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and 
supported water control projects in Mandate Palestine, an interest he shared with other 
Association members.27  
The most prominent non-engineer among the Association’s leadership was 
president Sir Louis Dane, who took the reins of the Association in 1935.28 Born into a 
family of Indian civil servants and military officers, Dane spent his career as a colonial 
administrator in the northwestern province of Punjab. Throughout a career that ended 
with him as governor of the expansive province, Dane was a committed supporter of a 
number of river control schemes within his territory.29 He promoted damming, 
canalization, and irrigation projects for what he perceived as their economic benefits and 
civilizing qualities,30 characterizing them as having almost miraculous potential.31 
Always with one eye focused on the possibilities of river development, he scouted the 
location of what is today one of Asia’s largest dams, the Sukkur Barrage, while on a 
boating excursion in 1908.32 In the same years that Dane was proposing to dam and, in a 
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sense, canalize the Thames, he was petitioning the Colonial Office with a proposal to 
dam the Litani River and divert its waters to parched Mandate Palestine.33 
Each of these individuals were professionally linked to at least one other—often 
by having directly collaborated on the creation of a river control project. The entire 
network was fused through at least one link. Several individuals were further connected 
by the London-based East Asia Society after having first worked together abroad. While 
the details of how and when precisely the colonial colleagues joined ranks in the Barrage 
Association are lost, their diverse past associations, detailed in Figure 1, go some way in 
explaining it. 
The Barrage Association constantly underlined its colonial credentials as evidence 
of its members’ expertise in massive civil works projects. In Parliament, in newspaper 
columns, and in their promotional literature they and their supporters heralded the names 
and experiences of their colonial figures as shrewd, accomplished, indefatigable veterans 
of far greater challenges than “merely” damming the Thames.34 “[Ward and Musto’s] 
Sukkur Dam…[and MacDonald’s] Egyptian dams serve to put the Thames in its place,” 
argued the Barrage Association.35 Supporters in both Houses of Parliament and 
government agencies cited the eminence and imperial successes of the engineers as part 
of the basis for their support.36 The group comprised, said one Barrage Association 
member in the House of Lords, “the greatest engineers in the land.”37 And newspaper and 
other writers recited the colonial conquests of the Association’s engineers, like Murdoch 
MacDonald’s Aswan Dam on the Nile and the Punjab dams overseen by Sir Louis 
Dane.38 It was an age when engineers could be household names and imperial  
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Figure 1: Professional connections, most made in the Empire, between Barrage Association members 
1. Louis Dane and Edwin Lutyens worked closely together on the creation of New Delhi. Dane was Lieutenant 
Governor of the Punjab (1908-1913) out of which the capital was carved on the west bank of the Yamuna 
(formerly Jumna) River.39  
2. Edgar Bonham-Carter worked with Murdoch MacDonald on the creation of the Sennar Dam in the Sudan. 
MacDonald prepared the plans in 1913 and Bonham-Carter handled the legal and diplomatic aspects of planning, 
with the two collaborating directly.40 
3. Sir Thomas Ward was a water control engineer for the Indian Public Works Department with long experience 
in the Punjab before Sir Louis Dane assumed the Lieutenant Governorship of the province in 1908. Ward advised 
Dane on irrigation colonization and undertook dam and canalization projects in the Punjab, as well. Ward was 
also a member of the New Delhi Planning Committee with which Dane was associated. And Ward was a member 
of the East India Association, of which Dane was a frequent Council member and sometime Chairman.41 
4. Sir Thomas Ward collaborated with Edwin Lutyens as part of the New Delhi Planning Committee.42 
5. Arnold Musto was a water control engineer in Sindh, just south of the Punjab, during Sir Louis Dane’s 
Lieutenant governorship. After retiring from India in 1934, Musto joined the East India Association in London, 
of which Sir Louis Dane was Chairman.43 
6. Sir Murdoch MacDonald was brought into contact with the Thames Barrage Association’s other water control 
engineers, all of whom were Institution of Civil Engineers members, as ICE President generally, and directly via 
particular ICE events.44 
7. As Inspector General of Irrigation in India (1917-1922), Sir Thomas Ward was closely concerned with the 
approval and progress of the Sukkur Barrage scheme designed and executed by Arnold Musto. The two 
collaborated on a report on colonial water projects in 1938 intended to survey the possibilities for water control 
in sub-Saharan Africa. And the two interacted via the East India Association in London.45 
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engineering works made headlines, and the Association claimed both the names and 
headlines. 
 Evoking the names of colonial heroes like MacDonald, Dane, and Ward and their 
works amplified the Association’s suggestion that water control technologies like those 
employed so often in the colonies were a universal boon to societies. In other words, the 
Association’s engineers and other experts could just as easily apply them to Britain as 
India or Egypt. What is more, the Association played on a potential chauvinist instinct in 
their audience, suggesting that while the colonies were benefiting from the best river 
engineering of the age, Britain itself was not. “If this were Egypt or India, it would have 
been done long ago,” argued the Association in its literature.46 “The Thames [is] now 
falling short of the requirements  of the agglomeration of humanity on its shores… It 
would seem that [a “problem”] directly affecting the centre of the British Empire should 
merit first consideration,” the Association added.47 A supporter stated in the Cornhill 
Magazine that “the age that has seen the Nile controlled might easily see the Thames 
reduced to discipline.” If a river was failing or threatening a city “in any of our 
Colonies,” he wrote, “the newspapers would ring with invective…and…it would 
probably cost a Colonial Secretary his place.”48 The Association and its supporters 
implied that interests in Britain were neglecting Englishmen in favor of colonial subjects 
or colonial profit-seekers:  
In India alone there is an area under irrigation to-day larger than the whole 
of Great Britain. The Sukkur Dam, the Boulder, …the Egyptian dams 
serve to put the Thames in its place. …Wherever populations require food 
or electric current these huge dams arise. Yet when London bridges 
become underscoured…or its riverside is flooded as in January 1928, 
nothing is done and the tides continue to handicap transport and 
firefighting.49 
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The Association enumerated the handicaps imposed by an “unimproved” river: 
erosion on embankments and bridges, the threat of flood, and the danger that fireboats 
would be unable to approach burning buildings at low tide. But the argument that 
Association returned to most often was one of economic efficiency. While modern ships 
were increasing in tonnage and size, the river’s depth remained insufficient. The tides 
made navigation more dangerous at all times—not just at low tide, they argued. And on 
the twice-daily ebb tide, ships had to anchor at the mouth of the Thames—they would not 
fight the outgoing current or risk the low water level. Ships often had to take on pilots to 
navigate into the regulated dock basins; they also frequently faced long waits as they 
were allowed—one by one—into the dockyard’s locks. Pilotage, delays, and limited ship 
accommodations all cost importers and exporters money.50 The new barrage would 
incorporate massive locks to lift large ships into the new deep harbor pool. Dock facilities 
could be multiplied many times over, spreading upriver; large passenger and cargo ships 
could dock in the heart of the metropolis. Proponents claimed that the new city-side 
reservoir would also be a source of fresh water. Where it passed through central London, 
the Thames would now add to London’s water supply since it would no longer be 
inundated with salt water as tides rose and since silt from upriver would settle in less 
turbulent waters.51 
 The Barrage Association suggested that the Thames was a problem landscape and 
that it was shameful to leave that problem unsolved. Through	  this	  claim,	  Association	  members	  advocated	  damming	  the	  Thames	  by	  echoing	  arguments	  they	  had	  long	  articulated	  for	  their	  colonial	  engineering	  projects. Murdoch MacDonald, for example, 
argued that “mankind [would not] permit” the “waste” of an unimproved Nile.52 Arnold 
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Musto argued for greater control of the Indus on the grounds that not “improving” the 
river equaled embracing “stagnation” and, as a model of inaction, was a threat to the very 
moral character of Sindhi farmers.53 And Sir Louis Dane argued that “the development of 
industries and…prosperity of the peoples and provinces of India” depended on 
overcoming the cultural and natural obstacles to “the utilization of the power of the great 
rivers.”54 As members of the Thames Barrage Association, they decried the “waste” of 
economic opportunities, the shame of tolerating the “nuisances” that nature threw in the 
path of “modern requirements.”55 A tidal Thames was a problem that “need not be 
suffered much longer.”56 In a meeting between the Association and several government 
officials in 1942, Sir Louis Dane directly argued that the Association was modeling its 
aims for barrage-based economic development on its experiences in the empire. “Sir 
Louis Dane,” the meeting’s minutes record, “…argued from the advantages of raising the 
level of and controlling the flow of the rivers in the Punjab, which employed millions of 
acres to be irrigated, to the advantages of making the Thames at tideless.”57 
Related to arguments based on economic development, social-Darwinist anxieties 
also motivated the Barrage Association. Emerging strongly around the time that the 
barrage was first proposed, social-Darwinism and eugenics were popular ideas among 
British officialdom.58 They questioned not only whether the British were breeding young 
men physically fit to fight the Boers or the next rival, but whether British society—its 
economy, its technology and industry, as a whole—was a fit organism.59 They imagined 
that Britain was in a contest to be the fittest state-organism on Earth, just as Darwin’s 
finches had been in a contest to be the fittest to survive their niches. For the Barrage 
Association, the British were failing to adapt to—or rather, adapt—their  
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landscape and thus failing this test of the fittest. In their words, they were failing to 
employ the river up to its “carrying capacity limits.”60 Meanwhile, Britain’s up-and-
coming rivals in wealth and industry were transforming their waterways. It was time, one 
Association member wrote in The Times, to put the Thames “under proper control as is 
the case with almost every other European river of importance.”61 In a letter soliciting 
support from potential members, the Association wrote that it was a matter of “national 
importance in view of the increasing competition of Continental Ports,” competition that 
could be off-balanced by “facilities for the rapid discharge of vessels at all hours and at 
all points which would result from the creation of a deep tideless lake...”62 And the 
Association pointed to Americans’ success in the Panama Canal and dammed Charles 
River at Boston. 63 Europe, America, even India was creating more and more productive 
environments, the Association warned, while the Thames remained unimproved.64 “In an 
age of evolution,” members wrote, enhancing the Thames was a matter of “national 
interest.”65  
Putting the Thames to use for poor benighted East Enders 
Colonial administrators and engineers premised their water control schemes, in part, on 
the promise of new and greater opportunities for low-caste subjects. Barrages and canals 
were supposed to benefit the masses by employing them in construction, by potentially 
contributing to industrialization through hydropower, by expanding cultivable land, and 
by relieving population pressure by providing new opportunities to settle on formerly 
marginal soils.66 So water control schemes and the creation of colonies went hand-in-
hand. Association president Sir Louis Dane himself encouraged such so-called “canal 
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colonies” in the Punjab; these were supposed to benefit Indians and Britain economically, 
while providing employment and social mobility for poor Indians.67  
The Barrage Association and its supporters argued that the Thames scheme 
offered some of the same benefits to the lowest caste of Londoners. The estuary below 
the barrage would see higher tides because of the bottleneck that the barrage created; that 
is, with the new dam in place, the incoming tides would have to go somewhere—if it 
could no longer sweep up the river it would be forced pour over the river’s banks in 
places. To keep low-lying downriver lands from flooding, engineers would have to build 
great earthwork embankments at strategic locations extending in total around forty miles. 
In other words,  engineers would transform parts of the lower Thames into a canal 
contained by embankments, an engineering operation performed frequently in the Empire 
by the Association’s river engineers.68 This newly-reclaimed land would provide the 
foundations for new colonies of working-class Londoners and new factories. In the words 
of the Association, poor Londoners would be lifted from “the squalor of the East End 
with its crowded and unhealthy living” and transplanted into a new “belt of garden 
villages” along the canalized estuary with “modern accommodation.”69 Facing the river 
would be new factories in which the colonists would labor, enabling “the working 
population…to spread and so relieve the congestion of the ever-increasing East End 
population.”70 
 The Association would “make these places attractive to working people” in part 
by facilitating new public transportation services.71 The working-class colonists below 
the new Thames Barrage could readily reach central and western reaches of London on 
waterbuses, formerly impractical on the tidal Thames. The Association claimed that 
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“many thousands of workers” throughout London would have access to “modern London 
transport,” to “water-bus[es of]…modern design and speed estimated for a capacity of 16 
millions a year.”72 This argument, that as a reservoir the Thames would increase the 
mobility of Londoners, was one of the cornerstones of the Association’s argument for 
using the river to promote social efficiency; it was a counterargument to a 1934 public 
inquiry that had studied the possibilities of using of the Thames for more public transport 
only to rule that the swinging tides made a reliably and speedy service unlikely.73 “The 
heads of the London Passenger Transport Board are a landlubberly lot,” argued barrage 
supporter and MP A.P. Herbert. “It is a singular and saddening thing that in this great 
maritime country whose greatness has been built upon the water, and even in this House 
which stands beside the mighty Thames, anyone who suggests that our waterways should 
be more efficiently equipped and more fully utilised is [dismissed].”74 
The barrier prevails over the barrage 
The Thames Barrage was never built. The main thrusts of the Barrage Association in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, the late 1930s, and the mid-1940s failed. The 
creation of a new port authority for London in 1908 pushed consideration of a barrage off 
the public agenda the first time, even though it enjoyed the support of influential 
Londoners and attracted great interest from a number of local government bodies.75 The 
demands of fashioning a new authority simply drove consideration of a barrage off the 
table. In the 1930s, consideration of a Thames barrage was impeded by that very same 
body, the Port of London Authority. The PLA had jurisdiction over the Thames below 
Teddington weir; any question of transforming the river had to be brought for its 
consideration, first, and it was not interested in debating the matter. The Port Authority 
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raised technical objections, suggesting that sediment and sewage from upriver 
communities in the Thames Valley would accumulate in a Thames-turned-reservoir.76 
“The Port Authority feel that the proposed scheme is one which they alone, in the 
exercise of powers entrusted to them by the legislature, are competent to pass judgment,” 
the PLA stated, “They have rejected it as being…undesirable.”77 The Association 
answered that their colonial engineers and administrators had proven themselves up to 
any technical challenge damming the Thames, a mere stream compared to the Indus or 
Tigris, could present.78 “Immensely larger quantities of water…have been put under 
human control by modern engineering under conditions much more difficult than can 
ever obtain in the Thames,” they argued.79  
But finally, in spring 1938, the Association influenced enough of the right 
individuals and brought enough pressure to bear in the public discourse that it won a 
public hearing under the auspices of the hostile Port Authority, but presided over by 
neutral engineer.80 The Association had won the support of key individual members of 
the London County Council and, especially because of the scheme’s advantages for river 
commuter transport, won a majority’s support for a public inquiry, at least.81 And the 
Association had the support of eight London Borough and Town Councils.82 But just one 
week before the hearing was to take place in March 1938, word came down from the 
Committee for Imperial Defence that the barrage would present too attractive a target for 
enemy bombardment. The committee feared that a breach would leave shipping or 
military vessels on the upriver side of the barrage stranded. In its secret report to the 
Ministry of Transport, the committee admitted that the barrage would probably increase 
the shipping traffic in the Port of London, but that such a concentration of ships was a 
drawback in times of looming war.83 The Barrage Association maintained its pressure, 
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though, and saw an opportunity when thoughts turned to rebuilding London, especially 
the docklands.84 The Association redoubled its efforts, publishing a book promoting the 
scheme in 1943, yet that renewed effort too came to naught.85 The Barrage Association 
struggled to win its project enough attention given rival demands of war and 
reconstruction.86 And perhaps, as historians have suggested, British colonial governments 
were more willing to experiment with technical and social schemes than the metropolitan 
governments.87 But whatever else, the Barrage Association was struck a great blow by 
the losses of key colonial leaders: Sir Thomas Ward and Sir Edwin Lutyens died in 1944, 
and Sir Louis Dane died in 1946.  
Today’s Thames Barrier is only remotely the offspring of the barrage. The barrier 
had its origins in the devastating flood of 1953. That January, high tides, fierce wind, and 
low pressure combined to drag a surge of water up the estuary and over the river’s banks. 
Over 30,000 were evacuated and over 300 died. The river came within inches of 
breaching the embankments in central London: Londoners imagined even worse 
consequences had the waters not receded at the final moment. Members of the Barrage 
Association had no part in planning for the barrier. The barrier’s designer, Charles 
Draper, only began his career in 1948 and worked entirely in Britain; nor was the 
barrier’s chief engineer a veteran of colonial river engineering.88 Its design—really a set 
of liftable gates that usually sit on the river bottom barring nothing—had nothing in 
common with the Association’s stationary dam with its integral road and railway. Flood 
protection was a relatively low priority for the Barrage Association, which never 
imagined a surge like that of 1953, while preventing flooding was the raison d’etre of the 
barrier. What is more, the Barrage Association was motivated by a vision of making the 
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river a more productive economic and social amenity or apparatus; the barrier had no 
such function.  
The Greater London Council, which investigated and commissioned the barrier in 
the late 1960s and the 1970s, was solely focused on diverting disaster, it did not aim to 
halt tides and fundamentally transform the Thames.89 One reason it dismissed a barrage 
was because investigators were concerned about the possibility of silt born downriver 
from the Thames Valley collecting in a tideless pool in a dammed river. Engineer Ray 
Horner, who took part in the planning for the present-day Thames Barrier, writes that he, 
for one, feared this; had Londoners halted that action, silt would have settled to the river 
bottom or anywhere it met resistance:  
The proposal would have altered the regime of the river drastically and the 
resulting siltation would have been so heavy that dredging would not have 
been practical. …The reduced volume of water moving to and fro will not 
have the power to keep the river silt in suspension, silt will be deposited 
along the sides of the estuary and the cross section of the waterway will be 
reduced. 90 
 
The expanded port facilities that the Barrage Association envisioned would, Horner 
believes, most likely have silted closed, for example, and the river would have actually 
become more shallow than before.91  
 In their imperial river control projects, the Association’s engineers encountered 
unforeseen and sometimes disastrous outcomes of their dams, canals, and canal colonies. 
The landscape did not always behave as their data suggested it would and the societies 
that they sought to shape did not always change as expected. Unfamiliar soil and rock 
types contributed to collapsed works, irrigation proved unsustainable, and local 
communities resisted the changes that river control works brought to their daily lives and 
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livelihoods.92 If retrospective assessments are correct, it is possible that colonial 
engineers’ plans for colonizing the Thames would have played out in unanticipated and 
unfortunate ways. In this manner, at least, the outcomes of imperial river engineering 
might indeed have been universal the world over. 
Conclusions 
Besides contributing to a picture of a decentered empire, this case adds to a body of work 
on urban environmental history. That literature explores how human communities have 
sought to transform water, land, and organisms in order to transform themselves. William 
Cronon describes how Chicagoans extended their reach into distant hinterlands to 
transform and consume the resources of the American plains;93 Martin Melosi details 
how towndwellers moved waste through and out of their midst via hidden technologies in 
order to prosper;94 and Jared Orsi reveals the creation of a ubiquitous system of flood 
defense system for Los Angeles that at once threatens and sustains its success.95 All of 
these stories describe the creation of technical systems that appear to conquer or disable 
nature so that human will can be done; but the technologies actually wed human and non-
human at the site of the city, so that the fate of both are more and more intertwined. A 
change in one extends far into the other. The case of the proposed Thames barrage would 
have been no different. Even as the Barrage Association was proposing annihilating the 
tides and “unmaking” the Thames as a river, they were never capable of eliminating the 
forces of nature and were only on the verge of managing land and water ever more 
minutely. 
 Crowning the Victoria Embankment is a 3500-year-old Egyptian obelisk that 
originated at the apex of the Nile delta that Londoners call “Cleopatra’s Needle.” In 1877 
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it was shipped from Egypt under the guidance of engineer Benjamin Baker, who was 
advising Egypt on canal and rail projects and who would eventually oversee the 
construction of the first Aswan dam on the Nile. The Needle is pictured in Jonathan 
Schneer’s London 1900, in which he argues that the character of the metropolis at the 
turn of the century was heavily shaped by the existence of the empire.96 The empire 
permeated London decoration and architecture, entertainments and other popular culture, 
and its political culture, he argues. The case of the Thames barrage scheme fits into 
Schneer’s picture of an imperial center integrated with the empire via culture and politics; 
the colonial engineers and officials who pushed the colonial reform of the Thames were 
members of a colonial culture that crisscrossed the world and had an important crossroad 
in London. But the story of the empire manifesting itself through a great engineering 
project (or in this case, trying but failing) is absent from histories like Schneer’s and 
others that have tended to focus on very different cultural expressions, from 
advertisements to music-hall shows.97 
 And it was perfectly natural for members of that particular colonial culture to 
recommend applying the technological and social principles they employed in the empire 
to Britain. This case reconfirms that they believed that theirs was a science and art that, 
though learned as apprentices or students in the British Isles, could be applied to 
landscapes (and ultimately to societies) the world over. Timothy Mitchell has 
demonstrated that British imperial officials felt that, with their science, economics, and 
other disciplines, the British had discovered principles “unquestionably true in every 
country.”98 Engineers’ craft was supposed to be universal. In the halls of the Institution of 
Civil Engineers they discussed the canalization of rivers in the U.S., Europe, and India all 
in the same breath; they believed that not only was water water and soil soil the world 
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over, but that social and economic outcomes from water projects would be the same the 
world over.99 Colonial water engineers, therefore, had no reason to doubt that the 
application of their river control experience in London would result in technical success, 
economic efficiency, and social change. This is a story of colonial figures bringing 
colonial experiences and frameworks to bear on a metropolitan landscape, but it is also 
the case that some aspects of engineering culture of this period—the preference for 
magnitude and quick economic returns, a shared set of professional standards and 
techniques, and so on—are not easily deciphered as inherent to the center or periphery. 
 While colonial engineers and administrators were confident that they were 
improving the lot of colonial subjects, water control was social control through indirect 
means or, to use the phrase of theoretical literature, a mode of governmentality.100 The 
colonies, dams, canals, and reservoirs changed everyday lives by changing economies, by 
changing settlement patterns, and by changing from whence people procured their daily 
water, to name just a few transformations. Water projects made certain ways of life 
possible and other ways of life, ways looked upon with disfavor by colonial agents, less 
available. But if those individuals who undertook “governmental” projects in the colonies 
could also be behind domestic schemes of the same kind, it should color how historians 
depict colonial water control. In other words, this case should make it more difficult to 
render any easy separation of colonial and domestic technology and culture. 
 What this truly suggests is that the Thames existed in a sort of quantum dual state; 
it was at once a landscape as domestic as could be, “a national river in a way that other 
rivers are not,” in Schneer’s words, but at certain moments it could slip states and 
become an imperial landscape. 101  The Thames, a place in Britain, was part of imperial 
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space. Henri Lefevre and those who have applied his spatial analysis have shown that 
places combine with social practices, ideas, and artifacts to create spaces that can 
powerfully influence societies.102 Combinations of architecture, customs, technology, 
maps, and any number of material and ideal factors can combine to create a space that 
guides and limits human possibilities in ways that can be the equal of any legal or 
economic factor. These spaces can be centered on a small site or they can span 
continents. One of the contributions that the case of the proposed Thames barrage offers 
for thinking about the British Empire is that it shows that imperial space and domestic 
space could overlay one another at sites less obvious than Trafalgar Square or Cleopatra’s 
Needle. The Thames was at once purely British and, as the heroes of colonial engineering 
with the Thames Barrage Association briefly made it, as imperial as the Nile at Aswan. 
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